Optimal Investment in Health when Lifetime is Stochastic, or, Rational Agents do not Often Follow Health Agency Recommendations by Bolin, Kristian & Caputo, Michael R.
ISSN 1403-2473 (Print)  
ISSN 1403-2465 (Online) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper in Economics No. 734 
 
Optimal Investment in Health when Lifetime 
is Stochastic, or, Rational Agents do not 
Often Follow Health Agency 
Recommendations 
 
Kristian Bolin and Michael R. Caputo 
 
Department of Economics,  August 2018
 
 
Optimal Investment in Health when Lifetime is Stochastic, or, 
Rational Agents do not Often Follow Health Agency Recommendations 
 
 
Kristian Bolin 
Department of Economics 
Centre for Health Economics 
University of Gothenburg 
Gothenburg, Sweden 
email: kristian.bolin@economics.gu.se 
 
Michael R. Caputo§ 
Department of Economics 
University of Central Florida 
P.O. Box 161400 
Orlando, FL 32816-1400 
email: mcaputo@ucf.edu 
 
Abstract 
A health-capital model is contemplated which accounts for the consumption of many goods, a 
stock of health and investment in it, as well as an agent’s random lifetime and accumulation of 
wealth.  It is shown that if an agent maximizes the expected discounted value of lifetime utility, 
or if an agent maximizes the expected value of their lifetime, then an agent does not follow the 
health-investment policy that minimizes the conditional probability of dying at each point in 
time, in general.  What is more, simple and intuitive sufficient, and necessary and sufficient, 
conditions are identified whereby such agents investment more or less in their health than said 
policy. 
 
Keywords:  health capital; health investment; optimal control; random lifetime 
 
JEL Codes: C61; D11; I12 
 
§ Corresponding author.  The manuscript was developed during May of 2018, while Michael was 
an Erik Malmstens visiting professor in the Department of Economics at the University of 
Gothenburg. 
Rational Agents do not Often Follow the Health Advice of Others 
 2 
1.  Introduction 
The notion that people make consumption and investment choices with at least some recognition 
of their health goes back to Grossman (1972).  Indeed, two core features of his health-capital 
model are that health is conceptualized as a stock and that individuals produce increments to it 
by combining market goods and services with their time.  Even though Grossman’s (1972) initial 
formulation focused on medical care goods and services, later extensions allowed for a broader 
variety of goods, services, and health-related behaviors, as in, e.g., Muurinen (1982), Ehrlich and 
Chuma (1990), and Bolin and Lindgren (2016).  Theoretical treatments that follow in this tradi-
tion and also incorporate the influence of individual health-related decisions on the conditional 
probability of survival include Levy (2002), Yaniv (2002), and Dragone (2009).  A common fea-
ture of the aforesaid papers is that an individual is assumed to maximize lifetime utility by allo-
cating resources between competing purposes, of which good health is but one. 
 Lifetime utility depends, of course, on both instantaneous utility and length of life.  In 
fact, for a given time-path of instantaneous utility, lifetime utility is at a maximum when length 
of life is too.  Despite this connection, most theoretical treatments of individual health-
investment choices emphasize the trade-off between health-investment and consumption deci-
sions without paying explicit attention to their influence on an agent’s lifetime.  This is not accu-
rate, needless to say.  Moreover, there is substantial medical evidence, some of which is present-
ed below, that supports the existence of a U-shaped relationship between all-cause mortality and 
various health-related rates of consumption and investment.  Consequently, without accounting 
for the fact that the conditional probability of dying depends on current and accrued health-
related decisions, health-capital models remain incomplete. 
 Perhaps the first paper to analyze the demand for longevity is that by Ehrlich and Chuma 
(1990).  They addressed the matter in a deterministic setting by assuming that an agent maximiz-
es lifetime utility and chooses, among other things, the time of death.  But by making the time of 
death a decision variable, their model only applies to cases in which an agent chooses when to 
die, to wit, suicide.  As a result, the manner in which Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) treat length of 
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life cannot address its inherent stochastic nature nor the fact that its probability distribution can 
be influenced by certain actions that an agent might take.  Similarly, Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) 
performed a numerical analysis of optimal ageing and death in a deterministic life-cycle model, 
and they too treated the time of death as a decision variable. 
 Ehrlich (2000) addressed the above two limitations by treating the time of death as a ran-
dom variable and permitting its hazard rate to be influenced by health investment.  But as in 
Levy (2002) and Dragone (2009), Ehrlich (2000) did not formally account for the fact that the 
probability of dying by any time is a state variable and therefore should be included as such in an 
optimal control representation of a health-capital model.  The present work corrects that omis-
sion, and as in Yaniv (2002) and Caputo and Levy (2012), includes the said probability as a state 
variable in the optimal control formulation of the contemplated health-capital model. 
 As noted above, the medical literature indicates that several health-related consumption 
goods and investment activities have a non-monotonic effect on the probability of dying.  Indeed, 
for each good and activity, there is medical evidence that a physiological rate that maximizes the 
positive effect on health, or minimizes the conditional probability of dying, or both, exists.  For 
instance, a U-shaped association between all-cause mortality and alcohol consumption was found 
by Grönbaeck (2009) and Fuller (2011), and between all-cause mortality and the energy and nu-
tritional content of food by Steinhausen (2002) and Steinhausen and Weber (2009).  And 
Schnohr et al. (2015) and Lee et al. (2015) documented a U-shaped association between all-cause 
mortality and the amount of jogging.  Finally, Morton et al. (2009) and Schnohr et al. (2015) pre-
sented evidence that too little or too much exercise increases the probability of dying.  So, for 
many goods and activities, there exists a rate which minimizes the conditional probability of dy-
ing, known as the physiological optimal rate.  Presumably, nutritional and lifestyle guidelines is-
sued by various health authorities in many countries are based on such epidemiological findings. 
 The aforementioned medical evidence is taken seriously in what follows.  In particular, 
the paper aims to develop a general model of consumption and health investment that, among 
other things, (i) contemplates the consumption of many goods unrelated to health, (iii) includes a 
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health-investment choice and a stock of health, (iv) allows for a nonmonotonic health production 
function, and (v) treats the time of death as a random variable whose conditional probability dis-
tribution is influenced by certain decisions that an agent makes.  In this general setting it is prov-
en that agents do not, in general, follow publicly-issued nutritional and lifestyle guidelines of 
governmental agencies or of their physician, and instead typically choose to overinvest or under-
invest in their health. 
2.  The Health Capital Model and Assumptions 
A crisp development of the generalized health-capital model is presented below.  Certain canoni-
cal assumptions are noted along the way, but those critical to the main result are stated formally 
and discussed explicitly after the optimal control problem is developed. 
 To begin, let  C(τ )∈! +
M  denote the consumption vector of nondurable goods that does 
not affect an agent’s stock of health  H (τ )∈! +  at time τ , and let  I(τ )∈! +  denote an agent’s 
health-investment rate at time τ .  Instantaneous preferences are represented by a felicity func-
tion U(⋅) , and agents are assumed to care about the consumption of nondurable goods, health, 
and investment in health.  Accordingly, the value of U(⋅)  at time τ  is U C(τ ),H (τ ), I(τ )( ) . 
 The state equation for the health stock is  !H (τ ) = F I(τ )( )−δH (τ ) , where  δ ∈! ++  is an 
exogenous rate of depreciation of the stock of health, and F(⋅)  is a health production function, 
mapping the rate of investment in health to the rate-of-change of the health stock with respect to 
time.  This specification is general and realistic, in that, as discussed below, it allows for a non-
linear and nonmonotonic effect of investment on the health stock.  What is more, health invest-
ment is interpreted broadly, and could include the consumption rates of numerous goods that in-
fluence the stock of health, or physical or medical activities that have the same general quality.  
Such an interpretation is also fully consistent with the medical research cited in §1. 
 Let τ = t  be an arbitrary but fixed base time of an optimal control problem, that is, time 
τ = t  is the initial date of the planning horizon and hence the date at which the optimization de-
cision is made.  Given this convention, Caputo (2017) has shown that the archetypal lifetime 
budget constraint from the perspective of base time τ = t  may be written in the form of an ordi-
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nary differential equation, viz.,  !A(τ ) = rA(τ )+Y0 +Y H (τ )( )− ′pCC(τ )− pI I(τ ) , and an initial 
condition, namely, A(t) = At , where  pC ∈! ++
M  is the price vector of the consumption goods, 
 pI ∈! ++  is the price of health investment,  r ∈ ++  is an interest rate, A(τ )  is wealth at time τ , 
 At ∈  is a given value of wealth at base time t , Y (⋅)∈C
(2)  is a health-dependent income flow 
function,  Y0 ∈ ++  is an exogenous flow of income, and “ ′  ” denotes transposition. 
 The final aspect of the model addresses the fact that time of death is a random variable.  
Therefore, let the probability of dying by time τ  be given by a cumulative density function P(⋅) , 
where P(τ )∈[0,1]  for all τ ∈[0,T ] ,  T ∈! ++ , P(0) = 0 , and  P(T ) = 1.  It is assumed that the 
probability of dying at time τ  given survival until time τ —known as the hazard function—is a 
function of the stock of health and health investment, i.e.,  !P(τ ) 1− P(τ )[ ] = Φ H (τ ), I(τ )( ) .  This 
specification reflects the aforementioned medical evidence in that both the rate of health-
investment and its accumulated effects, as reflected in the health stock, jointly influence the con-
ditional probability of dying.  A simple rearrangement of the above hazard equation yields 
 
!P(τ ) = Φ H (τ ), I(τ )( ) 1− P(τ )[ ]  as a state equation, with initial condition P(0) = 0  and terminal 
condition  P(T ) = 1. 
 In order to formulate the objective functional of an expected discounted lifetime-utility-
maximizing agent, the stochastic nature of an agent’s lifetime must be taken in to account.  To 
this end, note that the discounted value of lifetime utility at base time t ∈[0,T ) , from base time 
t  until time τ > t  in the future, is 
 U C(s),H (s), I(s)( )e−ρ[s−t ] ds
t
τ
∫ , (1) 
where  ρ ∈! ++  is the rate of time preference.  By definition, expected discounted lifetime utility 
is found by multiplying the discounted value of lifetime utility between base time t  and a possi-
ble time of death τ  given in Eq. (1), by the probability of dying at time τ , namely,  !P(τ ) , and 
then integrating the aforesaid product over all possible times of death τ ∈[t,T ] , thereby resulting 
in the expression 
Rational Agents do not Often Follow the Health Advice of Others 
 6 
 
 
!P(τ ) U C(s),H (s), I(s)( )e−ρ[s−t ] ds
t
τ
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥dτ
t
T
∫ . (2) 
The final step is to render Eq. (2) suitable for analysis by the methods of optimal control.  To this 
end, let u(τ ) =def U C(s),H (s), I(s)( )e−ρ[s−t ] ds
t
τ
∫  and  dv(τ ) =def !P(τ )dτ , and integrate Eq. (2) by 
parts to arrive at 
 
 
!P(τ ) U C(s),H (s), I(s)( )e−ρ[s−t ] ds
t
τ
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥dτ
t
T
∫ = P(τ ) U C(s),H (s), I(s)( )e−ρ[s−t ] ds
t
τ
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
τ=t
τ=T
− P(τ )U C(τ ),H (τ ), I(τ )( )e−ρ[τ −t ] dτ
t
T
∫
= U C(τ ),H (τ ), I(τ )( )[1− P(τ )]e−ρ[τ −t ] dτ
t
T
∫ ,
  (3) 
seeing as the dummy variable of integration is immaterial, P(t)∈[0,1] , and  P(T ) = 1. 
 Pulling all of the above information together, an agent is asserted to behave as if solving 
the optimal control problem 
 max
C(⋅),I (⋅)
U C(τ ),H (τ ), I(τ )( ) 1− P(τ )[ ]e−ρ[τ −t ] dτ
t
T
∫  
 s.t.   !A(τ ) = rA(τ )+Y0 +Y H (τ )( )− ′pCC(τ )− pI I(τ ) , A(t) = At , (4) 
  !H (τ ) = F I(τ )( )−δH (τ ) , H (t) = Ht , 
  !P(τ ) = Φ H (τ ), I(τ )( ) 1− P(τ )[ ] , P(t) = Pt , P(T ) = 1 , 
where  Ht ∈! ++  is a given value of the health stock at the base time and Pt ∈[0,1]  is a given 
value of the cumulative density function at the base time.  In order to ease the notation in what 
follows, define  θ =
def (t,At ,Ht ,Pt ,T ,pC , pI ,Y0,δ ,ρ,r)∈!M+10  as the parameter vector. 
 The following assumptions are imposed on problem (4) and discussed subsequently. 
(A1) For all  (C,H , I )∈! ++
M ×! ++ ×! ++ , U(⋅)∈C (2) , UCi (C,H , I ) ≥ 0 , i = 1,2,…,M , and 
UH (C,H , I ) > 0 . 
(A2) For all  H ∈! ++ , Y (⋅)∈C
(2)  and ′Y (H ) > 0 . 
(A3) For all  I ∈! ++ , F(⋅)∈C
(2) . 
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(A4) For all  (H , I )∈! ++ ×! ++ , Φ(⋅)∈C
(2) , strongly convex, and ΦH (H , I ) < 0 , while for all 
 H ∈! ++  there exists an  I = I (H )∈! ++  such that Φ I H , I (H )( ) ≡ 0 . 
(A5) For all θ ∈B(θ0;ε ) , there exists an interior and finite optimal control vector for problem 
(4), denoted by C∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) , with corresponding states A∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ),P∗(τ ;θ)( )  
and costates λA(τ ;θ),λH (τ ;θ),λP (τ ;θ)( ) , where θ0  is a given value of θ , and B(θ0;ε )  is 
an open (M +10)-ball  centered at θ0  of radius ε > 0 . 
 Assumption (A1) asserts that instantaneous preferences are monotonic in the goods unre-
lated to health, but strongly monotonic in health, meaning that health is always a good as far as 
instantaneous preferences are concerned.  On the other hand, as no stipulation on the sign of the 
marginal utility of health investment has been made, health investment could be a good, neutral, 
or a bad with regard to instantaneous preferences.  This allows for a wider range of behavior than 
the prototypical assumption, scilicet, UI (C,H , I ) ≡ 0 , as shown in the ensuing section.  Note too 
that concavity of the felicity function, a ubiquitous assumption in the literature extant, has not 
been assumed. 
 Supposition (A2) says that the health-dependent income flow function is strictly increas-
ing in the health stock, i.e., health is a good with respect to income, which is the usual assump-
tion.  Note too that no concavity assumption has been placed on the health production function. 
 Assumption (A3) allows for health investment to have a nonmonotonic effect on the rate 
of change of the health stock with respect to time, seeing as the marginal product of health in-
vestment may be positive, zero, or negative.  As will be demonstrated in the ensuing section, the 
fact that ′F (I ) <> 0  permits the model to capture a wider range of behavior than if the archetypal 
assumption were made, to wit, ′F (I ) > 0 .  Observe again that no concavity assumption has been 
placed on the health production function either. 
 By a well-known theorem from convex optimization, assumption (A4) implies that in-
vesting in health at the rate I = I (H )  globally and uniquely minimizes the conditional probabil-
ity of dying at each point in time for any given positive value of the stock of health.  This implies 
a U-shaped relationship between health investment and the conditional probability of dying for 
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any positive value of the health stock.  It is important to note that this assumption and the proper-
ties that it implies reflect the medical evidence presented in §1 regarding a U-shaped relationship 
between all-cause mortality and various forms of health-related behaviors. 
 And finally, due to the lack of assumptions on the functions employed in formulating 
problem (4), supposition (A5) is essential, as without it one cannot guarantee that a solution of 
the necessary conditions exists.  Moreover, there is not a simple set of conditions that could be 
placed on the felicity, health-dependent income, and health production functions, such as con-
cavity, that would permit one to invoke Mangasarian- or Arrow-type sufficient conditions, there-
by pointing to the essential nature of assumption (A5). 
3.  The Main Theorem and Extensions 
Before the main theorem can be established, the following technical result must be introduced.  
Its proof and that of Theorem 1 are given in the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 1.  Let assumptions (A1)–(A5) hold.  If λP (τ ;θ) < 0∀(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε )  then 
λH (τ ;θ) > 0∀(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
 
 Lemma 1 states that if the expected lifetime marginal utility of the probability of dying 
by time τ  is negative at each point in time of an agent’s lifetime but the last, then the expected 
lifetime marginal utility of health is positive at all points in time but the last.  This is a desirable 
property stemming from the intuitive stipulation that an increase in the probability of dying by 
time τ  makes an agent worse off.  Given the assumptions UH (C,H , I ) > 0 , ′Y (H ) > 0 , and 
ΦH (H , I ) < 0 , i.e., health is a good in all manners possible, it is not surprising that the expected 
lifetime marginal utility of health is positive at all points in time but the last.  Indeed, any other 
conclusion would be implausible under the foregoing assumptions.  With Lemma 1 in place, the 
main result can be stated. 
 
Theorem 1.  Let assumptions (A1)–(A5) hold and assume λP (τ ;θ) < 0∀(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
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(i) If for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , UI C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) = 0  and ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) = 0 , 
then I ∗(τ ;θ) = I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
(ii) If for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , UI C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≥ 0 , ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≥ 0 , and 
either derivative is positive, then I ∗(τ ;θ) > I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
(iii) If for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , UI C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≤ 0 , ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≤ 0 , and 
either derivative is negative, then I ∗(τ ;θ) < I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
 
 Part (i) of Theorem 1 gives simple sufficient conditions under which the health-
investment rate that maximizes an agent’s expected lifetime utility also minimizes the condition-
al probability of dying at each point in time but the last.  In particular, it shows that if the instan-
taneous marginal utility and marginal product of health investment vanish at each point in time 
of an agent’s lifetime but the last, then the expected lifetime utility maximizing rate of health in-
vestment also minimizes the conditional probability of dying at each point in time but the last.  
Note too that this pair of sufficient conditions is a knife’s-edge case—a probability zero event 
that almost never happens—and thus forms a dividing line between the overinvestment and un-
derinvestment cases given in parts (ii) and (iii), respectively. 
 If I = I (H )  is interpreted as the health-investment recommendation of physicians, or that 
of a health agency, then Theorem 1 can be interpreted colloquially.  In this case, it asserts that ra-
tional agents do not generally follow the advice of their physician or health authority regarding 
health-investment decisions.  Said differently, if one’s physician or a health agency asserts that 
certain health-investment rates are best, rational agents will almost always choose a different rate 
of health investment than recommended. 
 Note too that Theorem 1 is a general result, as it applies to an optimal control problem 
with M  consumption goods that are unrelated to heath, health investment, and three state varia-
bles, namely, health, wealth, and the cumulative density function of an agent’s lifetime.  What is 
more, it only relies on assumptions (A1)–(A5) and Lemma 1.  Indeed, there are no strong or unu-
sual assumptions placed on instantaneous preferences, or on the income flow, health production, 
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or conditional probability of dying, functions, nor are the said functions assumed to take a par-
ticular functional form.  What is more, U(⋅) , Y (⋅) , and F(⋅)  are not assumed to be concave. 
 Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1 give simple and intuitive sufficient conditions for “over-
investment” and “underinvestment” over an agent’s lifetime, respectively, relative to a policy 
that minimizes the conditional probability of dying at each point in time.  Take part (ii), for ex-
ample.  It asserts that if the instantaneous marginal utility and marginal product of health invest-
ment are nonnegative all along the solution, and either is positive, then rational agents overinvest 
in their health relative to a policy that minimizes the conditional probability of dying at each 
point in time.  In this case, health investment provides a marginal benefit via the felicity function 
and another by way of the health production function.  With health investment having two mar-
ginal benefits, it is plausible that rational agents would overinvest in health relative to a policy 
that minimizes the conditional probability of dying at each point in time.  Note too that this case 
subsumes the archetypal assumptions ′F (I ) > 0  and UI (C,H , I ) ≡ 0 .  Indeed, the prototype stip-
ulations imply that rational agents always overinvest in their health at each point in time. 
 In contrast to the archetypal assumptions, the present assumptions permit the model to 
explain why individuals might choose to underinvest in their health.  Part (iii) shows that under-
investment in health is optimal when all along the optimal path the marginal utility of investment 
is negative and the marginal product of investment is not positive, or vice versa.  With two mar-
ginal costs associated with health investment it is no wonder that agents underinvest in their 
health.  The said archetypal assumptions yield a model incapable of explaining such behavior. 
 Implicit in Theorem 1 are weaker statements about the optimal rate of health investment 
too.  To see this, observe that Theorem 1 is predicated on the signs of certain derivatives holding 
over an agent’s lifetime.  But what if instead the marginal utility and marginal product of health 
investment were positive only over an subinterval of an agent’s lifetime, or even just at a particu-
lar point in time?  In this case, overinvest in health occurs over the said subinterval or point in 
time, rather than over an agent’s entire lifetime.  Consequently, the model is capable of deliver-
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ing a rational explanation as to why some individuals might underinvest in their health over 
some periods of time but overinvest in others, something the archetypal assumptions rule out. 
 Theorem 1 also holds if a more general assumption is made about a subset of the func-
tions and parameters, as summarized by the following. 
 
Theorem 2.  Let assumptions (A1)–(A5) hold.  If λP (τ ;θ) < 0∀(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , and 
(pC , pI ,Y0,δ ,r)  and F(⋅),Φ(⋅),Y (⋅)( )  are explicit functions of time, then the conclusions of Theo-
rem 1 et seq. continue to hold. 
 
 Theorem 2 asserts that if all the parameters but the rate of time preference are functions 
of time, and the income flow, health production, and conditional probability of dying, functions 
are too, then rational agents continue to generally ignore the advice of their physician or health 
authority regarding health-investment decisions.  Its veracity follows from the fact that the nec-
essary conditions under Theorem 2 are identical in form to those given by Eqs. (7)–(14) in the 
Appendix, as all that differs is the explicit time-dependence of the so-noted functions and param-
eters.  Consequently, Lemma 1 continues to hold, as do the conclusions of Theorem 1. 
 Now consider an agent who maximizes a different objective functional, namely, their ex-
pected lifetime from the perspective of base time t , given by 
 
τ !P(τ )dτ
t
T
∫ .  By employing the 
same integration-by-parts approach that was used in Eq. (3), it can be shown that 
 
 
τ !P(τ )dτ
t
T
∫ = [1− P(τ )]dτt
T
∫ + t[1− P(t)] . (5) 
Consequently, maximizing an agent’s expected lifetime, viz., 
 
τ !P(τ )dτ
t
T
∫ , is equivalent to max-
imizing [1− P(τ )]dτ
t
T
∫ , as t ∈[0,T ]  is an arbitrary but fixed base time and P(t) = Pt  is given.  
With this latter objective functional, it is straightforward to verify that the necessary conditions 
associated with it are a special case of those given in Eqs. (7)–(14) in the Appendix, found by 
setting U(C,H , I ) ≡ 1 and ρ ≡ 0 .  Hence the following corollary is immediate. 
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Corollary 1.  Let assumptions (A2)–(A5) hold and replace the objective functional of problem 
(4) with 
 
τ !P(τ )dτ
t
T
∫ .  If λP (τ ;θ) < 0∀(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , then 
(i) ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) = 0  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε )  if and only if I ∗(τ ;θ) = I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all 
(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , 
(ii) ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) > 0  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε )  if and only if I ∗(τ ;θ) > I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all 
(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) , and 
(iii) ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) < 0  for all (τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε )  if and only if I ∗(τ ;θ) < I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all 
(τ ,θ)∈[t,T )× B(θ0;ε ) . 
 
 Corollary 1 asserts that an agent who maximizes the expected value of their lifetime 
chooses to invest in their health at a rate that generally differs from that which minimizes the 
conditional probability of dying at each point in time, just like an expected lifetime utility max-
imizing agent.  But in this case the sufficient conditions are simplified and are also necessary, 
making for a more powerful conclusion.  Despite the similarities between Theorem 1 and Corol-
lary 1, the investment rates of an expected discounted lifetime-utility maximizer and an expected 
value of lifetime maximizer are not, in general, the same, as their objective functionals differ. 
4.  Conclusion 
Agents who maximize expected lifetime utility or the expected value of their lifetime, choose to 
invest in their health at a rate that generally differs from than that which minimizes the condi-
tional probability of dying at each point in time.  Stated colloquially, rational agents do not fol-
low the advice of their physician or health agency regarding health investment decisions, in gen-
eral.  The traditional assumptions imply that rational agents over invest in their health at every 
point in time of their lifetime, whereas the more general assumptions employed here permit an 
intuitive rationale as to why rational agents might overinvest or underinvest in their health, or 
even, on occasion, follow the recommendation of their physician. 
5.  Appendix 
Define the current-value Hamiltonian by 
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 Ψ(A,H ,P,C, I ) =
defU(C,H , I )[1− P]+ λA rA +Y0 +Y (H )− ′pCC− pI I[ ]
+λH F(I )−δH[ ]+ λPΦ(H , I )[1− P].
  (6) 
By Theorem 10.1 of Caputo (2005), the necessary conditions obeyed by C∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( )  are 
 UCi (C,H , I )[1− P]− pCiλA = 0 , i = 1,2…,M , (7) 
 UI (C,H , I )[1− P]− λA pI + λH ′F (I )+ λPΦ I (H , I )[1− P]= 0 , (8) 
  !λA = [ρ − r]λA , λA(T ) = 0 , (9) 
  !λH = [ρ +δ ]λH − [UH (C,H , I )+ λPΦH (H , I )][1− P]− λA ′Y (H ) , λH (T ) = 0 , (10) 
  !λP = [ρ +Φ(H , I )]λP +U(C,H , I ) , (11) 
  !A = rA +Y0 +Y (H )− ′pCC− pI I , A(t) = At , (12) 
  !H = F(I )−δH , H (t) = Ht , (13) 
  !P = Φ(H , I ) 1− P[ ] , P(t) = Pt , P(T ) = 1 , (14) 
Note that the solution of the necessary conditions holds for all θ ∈B(θ0;ε ) , so this stipulation 
will not be repeatedly spelled out in the following proofs in order to ease the notational burden. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1.  By Eq. (9), λA(τ ;θ) ≡ 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ] .  Consequently, Eq. (10) reduces 
to  !λH = [ρ +δ ]λH −G
∗(τ ;θ) , λH (T ) = 0 , where 
 G∗(τ ;θ) =def UH C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) + λP (τ ;θ)ΦH H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ 1− P∗(τ ;θ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , 
and G∗(T ;θ) = 0  as P(T ) = 1  from Eq. (14).  Integration of  !λH = [ρ +δ ]λH −G
∗(τ ;θ)  yields the 
general solution λH (τ ) = − e−[ρ+δ ][s−τ ]G∗(s;θ)dst
τ
∫ + ae[ρ+δ ]τ , where a  is a constant of integration.  
The transversality condition λH (T ) = 0  gives a = e−[ρ+δ ]sG∗(s;θ)dst
T
∫ , hence the specific solu-
tion is λH (τ ;θ) = e−[ρ+δ ][s−τ ]G∗(s;θ)dsτ
T
∫ .  Next, note that if λP (τ ;θ) < 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ) , then 
G∗(τ ;θ) > 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ) , as UH (C,H , I ) > 0  and ΦH (H , I ) < 0  by assumptions (A1) and 
(A4) respectively.  But then it follows that λH (τ ;θ) > 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ) .   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1.  As λA(τ ;θ) ≡ 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ]  by Eq. (9), Eq. (8) reduces to 
   
UI C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) 1− P∗(τ ;θ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + λH (τ ;θ) ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( )
≡ −λP (τ ;θ)Φ I H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) 1− P∗(τ ;θ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
 (15) 
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for all τ ∈[t,T ) .  By definition, P∗(τ ;θ)∈[0,1]  for all τ ∈[t,T ] .  Furthermore, if λP (τ ;θ) < 0  
for all τ ∈[t,T ) , then by Lemma 1 λH (τ ;θ) > 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ) .  Consequently, if 
UI C∗(τ ;θ),H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≥ 0 , ′F I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) ≥ 0 , and either is positive for all τ ∈[t,T ) , then 
it follows from Eq. (15) that Φ I H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) > 0  for all τ ∈[t,T ) .  Moreover, 
Φ I H ∗(τ ;θ), I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )( ) ≡ 0  for all τ ∈[t,T )  by assumption (A2).  Putting the two preceding 
deductions together gives Φ I H ∗(τ ;θ), I ∗(τ ;θ)( ) >Φ I H ∗(τ ;θ), I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )( )  for all τ ∈[t,T ) .  
But as Φ II (H , I ) > 0  for all  (H , I )∈! ++ ×! ++ , the preceding inequality implies that 
I ∗(τ ;θ) > I H ∗(τ ;θ)( )  for all τ ∈[t,T ) , which proves part (ii).  The proofs of the other parts are 
essentially identical and so are omitted.       Q.E.D. 
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